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''Kosovo could be our military euro,  
creating a political and defense identity  
for the European Union in the same way  
as the euro is the expression of  
economic  and financial integration” 
Ulrich Beck (1999) 
 
Introduction 
In which skies should auspices about the future 
of EU foreign policy be looked for, Libya’s or 
Kosovo’s? Many commentators have been 
prompt in digging the grave for EU Security and 
Defense Policy after Member States’ discordance 
over taking military action against the Qaddafi 
regime1. However, as this paper will emphasize 
through the case of Kosovo, unanimity is not al-
ways an indispensable prerequisite – and should 
not be regarded as the sole criteria – to EU ac-
tion in regional security. Overly focusing on the 
‘speak with one voice’ mantra sometimes leads 
to stop short of assessing actual outcomes.  
Furthermore, although the Lisbon Treaty did 
endow the EU with the instruments to stream-
line its foreign policy instruments, its tasks will 
probably consist less often in the near future in 
offensive military operations than in peace-
keeping, civilian crisis management and institu-
tion-building – as in Kosovo. Once the terrain 
for a more or less harmonious concert of Inter-
national Organizations, the Kosovo dossier is 
increasingly becoming an EU solo effort. Brus-
sels has taken the lead in the new round of 
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‘technical’ negotiations between Belgrade and 
Pristina. Similarly, the EULEX mission came to 
the forefront as it has been tasked to investigate 
the organ-trafficking allegations implicating the 
current Prime Minister of Kosovo2, thus getting 
Brussels further involved into war crimes issues 
(the region’s very own ‘frozen-conflicts’)3. The 
outcome of EU policies in and around Kosovo 
will be decisive, for the region and for the EU 
itself. 
Historically, crisis in the Balkans ignited the 
spark for an EU security policy and provided the 
laboratories for its outputs. European states’ 
variances and related incapacity during the post-
Yugoslavia conflicts goaded them into setting up 
a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
through the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. Similarly, 
the later creation of its military component 
(Common Security and Defense Policy, CSDP) at 
the Cologne Summit of June 1999 paralleled the 
war in Kosovo. Beyond institutional instru-
ments, the Kosovo crisis actually ignited a will – 
and was perceived as an occasion – to bolster EU 
identity as a political and security actor4. More 
acutely, the occurrence of a protracted conflict in 
its backyard was putting Europe’s integration 
project in jeopardy. Hence, both by necessity 
and desirous to consolidate its clout as a security 
actor, the Balkans have remained for the EU a 
region of utmost strategic importance, one 
where – as noted by the European Security 
Strategy (2003) – “the credibility of EU foreign 
policy” will be gauged. Accordingly, more than 
one fourth of CSDP missions (6 out of 24) were 
deployed in the Balkans5.  
The EU launched in Kosovo in December 2008 
its largest and most innovative mission to date: 
the EULEX Rule of Law mission. EULEX stands 
out as unique in several ways. First, EULEX is 
the largest deployment in terms of agents and 
contributing states. It is set to attain a final staff 
target of 3,200 (1,950 internationals, 1,250 lo-
cals), provided by 26 of the member-states plus 
Canada, Croatia, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey 
and – for the first time – the United States. 
Washington’s involvement in EULEX – although 
limited in number – is of particular symbolic im-
portance not only as it marks a further step in 
US recognition of EU security policy but also as 
Kosovo has been essentially a transatlantic pro-
ject (and an increasingly successful one)6. More-
over, with the US wishing to progressively pull 
out from the region, EULEX achievements will 
be at the core of Washington’s perception of the 
EU’s capacity to fully ‘take over’7. Second, as a 
fully integrated Rule of Law mission, EULEX has 
an unprecedented mandate combining three 
components (police, justice and customs) and 
assuming executive functions. Finally, it has 
adopted for the first time a ‘programmatic ap-
proach’, i.e. an operating method based on per-
formance indicators along which the strategy is 
revised every six months. 
Hence, because it is deployed in a strategic re-
gion where EU credibility is at stake and because 
it appears as the most innovative and ambitious 
CSDP mission to date, EULEX constitutes an 
ideal case-study to assess the role of the EU as a 
regional security actor. In this endeavor, after 
having briefly conceptualized some benchmarks 
for analysis, the paper will explore three core 
aspects of the EULEX mission: political con-
texts; mandate and activities; interaction with 
other international actors. First, the impact of 
the highly politicized context of its deployment – 
both on the ground and among member-states – 
will be assessed. Then, the mandate and the ac-
tivities of the mission will be scrutinized, paying 
particular attention to the issue of the ‘executive 
functions’ prerogative. Finally, the interactions 
of EULEX with both international agencies 
(NATO, OSCE, ICO) and European institutions 
(Commission, EUSR) will be analyzed. The con-
clusion will attempt to draw from EULEX gen-
eral lessons about EU practice in regional secu-
rity.  
 
Benchmarks for analysis  
The EU’s sui generis nature complicates the task 
not only of those in charge a framing a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy but also of those 
seeking to evaluate it8. How to assess the EU’s 
record and specificity as a security actor? How to 
investigate the activities and achievements of its 
missions? What benchmark to choose? I retain 
here the concept of actorness and will seek to 
analyze the EU’s capacity to behave actively and 
deliberately in relation to other international ac-
tors9.  
Beyond resources, four components of actorness 
will be studied: authority, autonomy, cohesion 
and recognition10. Authority refers to EU legal 
competence in international affairs and will be 
analyzed in the case of EULEX by looking at its 
mandate as well as at the legal framework in 
which it operates. Autonomy relates to EU insti-
tution distinctiveness and independence from 
other actors. This aspect will be crucial in study-
ing the case of EULEX; attention will be paid 
both to the mission’s room for maneuver in rela-
tion to Member States – in particular those 
which did not recognize Kosovo – and to its ca-
pacity to germinate its own goals and directions 
in coordination with other EU institutions. Co-
hesion pertains to the degree of unity among the 
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various agencies and stakeholders of EU external 
relations, whether in terms of methods or activi-
ties (i.e. tactical and operational efficiency). The 
‘challenge of coherence’ is particularly acute in 
the field of civilian crisis management as there 
both CSDP and community instruments are mo-
bilized by the EU11. Finally, the last crucial com-
ponent is that of recognition; the EU can effi-
ciently act as a security actor only as long as it is 
recognize as such by other international stake-
holders. Recognition accounts for the extent to 
which external actors accept the EU’s interna-
tional competence in a policy-area (de jure rec-
ognition) and acknowledge its legitimacy by in-
teracting with its agencies in that domain (de 
facto recognition). The EU’s clout as a security 
actor rests as much on its institutional capacity 
as on its external legitimacy, and the political 
impact of CSDP is not simply material but also 
largely symbolic12. In combining all these criteria 
constitutive of actorness, the putative “European 
way of doing crisis or post-conflict management” 
will be questioned through the prism of 
EULEX13.  
 
Kosovo: the mark of the context  
In contrast to many CSDP missions, EULEX ap-
pears molded more by the peculiar Kosovo con-
text than by Brussels’ institutional machinery. 
The political context sets the boundaries of 
EULEX’s scope of action. In this regard, the non 
settlement of the status question – i.e. the ab-
sence of a UN Security Council resolution en-
dorsing Kosovo’s independence – constrains its 
room for maneuver on the ground. In other 
words, in confronting an already eminently com-
plex and potentially unstable post-conflict situa-
tion, EULEX started off with political and insti-
tutional handicaps14. Three problematic conse-
quences of the status deadlock can be identified 
as consistent challenges for EULEX: the ques-
tion of acceptability and deployment in the 
North; the issue of the applicable law; the para-
dox of (unrecognized) state-building. 
Kosovo remains de facto a divided entity, with 
the territory north of the Ibar river populated by 
a majority of Serbs15. The city of Mitrovica exem-
plifies this separation along ethnic lines: the lan-
guage, currency and even schools’ subsidizations 
differ from one end of the ‘Austerlitz Bridge’ to 
the other. EULEX has been seeking acceptance 
by both Serbian and Albanian communities. But 
ultimately the mission has fueled some discon-
tentment among both – which could be inter-
preted as a sign of partiality. The Kosovo Serbs 
have been the most vocal opponents to the es-
tablishment of EULEX, accusing it of trespassing 
resolution 1244 and of sponsoring Kosovo’s in-
dependence by helping to build its institutions. 
This rejection caused several demonstrations, 
some of them turning into violent clashes with 
EULEX policemen, as in Brdjani16. Overall, 
EULEX presence and operability remains con-
strained in the North in comparison to the rest 
of the territory, although the situation is evolving 
positively. The re-opening of the Mitrovica court 
is an undeniable success in that regard. It is im-
portant to emphasize here that, contrary to what 
is often stated, EULEX difficulties in the North 
do not stem from Member States’ failure to find 
a consensus on the status question but rather 
from the Kosovo Serbs’ rejection of the mission’s 
state-building prerogatives. Stated differently, it 
is less due to five Member States not recognizing 
Kosovo than because twenty-two did17.  
On their part, Kosovo Albanians have been crav-
ing for a speedy emancipation from international 
trusteeship towards full sovereignty. Thus, some 
groups such as Vetëvendosja (Self-deter-
mination) have been demanding the removal of 
EULEX as they see it – somehow paradoxically – 
as a speed bump on the road towards EU mem-
bership. Some incidents also occurred in that 
context. In August 2009, demonstrators protest-
ing against a police agreement signed between 
Serbia and EULEX attacked several of the mis-
sion’s vehicles18. Furthermore, in March 2011 
however the Kosovo government openly criti-
cized EULEX for the first time, expressing con-
cern over the arrest of former member of the 
Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA)19. In the long 
run, EULEX acceptance from both communities 
will depend on its ability to deliver in the realm 
of justice, i.e. both in establishing the preemi-
nence of the rule of Law over informal networks 
and in handling with impartiality as well as effi-
ciency the war crimes trials. On the former as-
pect, while some arrests have been made re-
cently, EULEX remains criticized in the Kosovo 
media for its lack of results in its struggle against 
corruption and clientelism20. On the latter, the 
mission is playing the card of transparency by 
putting on its website the text of the rulings de-
livered by its judges21.  
The problem of political fragmentation also 
translates into legal conundrums. In terms of 
mandate, EULEX officially operates under UN 
resolution 1244. However, this general resolu-
tion is not fit to provide legal framework for 
EULEX’s comprehensive range of activities 
(police, justice and customs). Authorities in Pris-
tina have been pushing to apply their newly 
adopted Constitution to the whole territory, 
while Kosovo Serbs have been refusing to apply 
anything other than UNMIK regulations or ear-
4 
 
lier Yugoslav laws. So far, EULEX judges have 
been able to circumvent the problem by applying 
the legislation prevailing at the time of the alle-
gation.  
Finally, the fact that five of its member-states – 
namely Cyprus, Greece, Romania, Slovakia and 
Spain – did not recognize Kosovo independence 
undeniably complicates EU action. In a way, 
EULEX appears as an innovative mission that is 
forced to downplay its realizations in the ab-
sence of a consensus at the European Council. 
Cyprus in particular has adopted an uncompro-
mising posture, being the only capital not to con-
tribute to the staffing of the mission and having 
abstained in the vote of its deployment. More-
over, along with Madrid and Bucarest, Nicosia 
sent lawyers to the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) to testify against the legality of the declara-
tion of independence, where they faced-off law-
yers from eight other EU Member States22. Such 
a dramatic display of disunity has been 
(unnecessarily) detrimental to EU’s image; all 
Member States could have abstained from send-
ing any lawyers.  
Yet, beyond symbolic, several of the ‘non-
recognition’ consequences managed to somehow 
be circumvented on the ground, with the Mem-
ber States demonstrating a certain ‘unity of pur-
pose’. Most of the non-recognizing states do con-
tribute to the staffing of EULEX and some have 
diplomatic personnel in Kosovo (although no 
embassies). EULEX reporting machinery is 
bound to be overly carefully when it comes to the 
wording of official as well as internal documents. 
But overall the EU has been demonstrating a 
great deal of ingenuity in being able to deploy 
and run a Rule of Law mission assisting in the 
strengthening of institutions it doesn’t officially 
recognize23. This ‘schizophrenic posture’ how-
ever might be hard to sustain over the long run; 
it appears difficult for EULEX to remain a 
‘technical mission’ in an eminently political con-
text.  How far, for instance, can EULEX go in 
assisting to the set up of a customs system in 
Kosovo while avoiding the sovereignty issue? As 
underlined by Rupnik, in Kosovo as throughout 
the former Yugoslavia, the EU is confronted with 
problematic situations often coming down to the 
issue of the State in its territorial and Institu-
tional aspects; “how to engage in state-building 
without deciding which State is being built”?24 
 
An ambitious civilian operation 
Along the line established by the preparatory 
work of the European Union Planning Team 
(EUPT) operating in Kosovo since April 2006, 
the EU started the deployment of EULEX in De-
cember 2008. The mission declared its full op-
erational capacity in April 2009. Its main legal 
basis is the Council Joint Action adopted on the 
4th of February 200825. Between promotion of 
the Rule of Law and civilian crisis management, 
EULEX’s mandate consists in “assisting Kosovo 
authorities, judicial authorities and law en-
forcement agencies in their progress toward 
sustainability and accountability” through 
“monitoring, mentoring, and advising, while 
retaining certain executive functions”. EULEX 
Rule of Law activities are subsumed under three 
components (police, justice and customs), whose 
objectives, organizational structure and expected 
outputs are established within the framework of 
an overarching Programme Strategy26. 
The police component is the most substantial. 
EULEX aims at developing Kosovo Police (KP) 
capacities both at the administrative and opera-
tional level (i.e. forensics, Special Forces…). Be-
yond training and advice, EULEX agents actually 
monitor and sometimes assist KP officers on the 
ground. In that sense, EULEX is building upon 
the experience of previous Police Mission, ad-
dressing in particular some of the critics directed 
at an operation comparable in terms of context 
and purpose, EUPM Bosnia27. By deploying po-
lice officers in local stations and with corrective 
(i.e. executive) powers, EULEX take up the co-
location and substitution aspects that were lack-
ing in EUPM. More generally, other lessons-
learned include a more ambitious mandate – 
when EUPM’s narrow mandate was perceive as a 
way to elude taking responsibility – and the 
combination of police with judicial and norma-
tive elements – a functional approach to the for-
mer proved untenable in EUPM. However, some 
shortcomings noted in EUPM, such as police of-
ficers’ inherent difficulty in grasping the peculiar 
nature of post-conflict situation, still resonate in 
EULEX. Nevertheless, while “the mixed balance 
sheet which hangs over EUPM did not augur 
well for the EU’s other police missions”28, Brus-
sels demonstrated overall its capacity in capital-
izing on previous experiences and address major 
deficiencies29. 
In the judicial realm, EULEX also both advises 
Kosovo’s legal institution (on the structural or-
ganization of the Ministry of Justice) and retains 
executive functions (by taking part in prosecu-
tions and ruling). The latter are the most visible 
in the justice component as EULEX judges have 
jurisdiction on some specific crimes. Cases in-
volving allegations of war crimes, organized 
crime, money laundering and terrorism are 
prosecuted by mixed courts composed of a ma-
jority of EULEX judges. Similarly, the Supreme 
Court of Kosovo is composed of three EULEX 
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judges (including the Chairman) and two local 
judges. In terms of training judiciary personnel, 
EULEX justice component is to some extent 
comparable to previous CSDP missions such as 
Themis in Georgia and JUSTLEX in Iraq 
(although in the later case local judges are 
trained not on the ground but in EU member-
states). The exercise of ruling and prosecution 
on the part of EULEX judges stands out however 
as a significant novelty.  
EULEX is the first ESDP mission bearing a cus-
toms component. The aim is to train Kosovo cus-
toms officers and also to collect data on commer-
cial traffic in an endeavor to tackle smuggling. 
The custom dimension should not be viewed as 
trivial as almost two thirds of Kosovo revenues 
flow from the collection of custom duties. 
EULEX is not directly implied in the collection 
of customs revenue, it simply copies and stamps 
documents of vehicle transporting goods. In-
deed, borders irremediably evoke the question of 
sovereignty and, as a matter of fact, the ‘gates’ of 
the North (i.e. posts at the demarcation line with 
Serbia) have been the stage of recurrent demon-
strations.  
By its ability to combine essential elements of 
Rule of Law promotion, the EU demonstrates a 
solid know-how in terms of civilian missions. 
Through its three components, EULEX has the 
opportunity to fashion in a complete and com-
prehensive manner the institutions of Kosovo 
towards democratic benchmarks. While the inte-
grated nature of the mission had not been suffi-
ciently taken into account in the planning phase 
– and thus problems of coordination between 
the three pillars emerged in the early months of 
the deployment – months of operations have 
since improved their synchronization. The coor-
dination of the mission’s activities is still to be 
put to the test however in times of acute crisis, 
where the ‘programmatic approach’ – a method-
ology originally designed for development aid – 
might reveal its weaknesses30.  
Most importantly, the issue of the executive 
functions remains a potential bone for conten-
tion, fueling for instance the ‘Protectorate’ crit-
ics31. First of all, their activation is not always 
clearly defined and it is often let to the agent to 
judge when to wield his ‘corrective powers’. In 
that regard, the question of accountability of 
EULEX agents has been partly addressed: an 
independent advisory Human Right Review 
Panel (HRRP) where the local population will be 
able to file complaints has been set up32. The 
HRRP however is solely an advisory body de-
prived of judiciary or disciplinary competences. 
Second, questions linger as to what extent 
EULEX would be ready to use its executive pow-
ers against the highest officials of Kosovo (i.e. 
ministers), for instance in cases of organized 
crime allegations. 
 
Interaction with other Interna-
tional Actors 
In deploying amidst a plethora of international 
organizations, EULEX contributes both to dis-
close and to shape EU identity as a security ac-
tor. EULEX must ensure an effective coopera-
tion with other international stakeholders while 
at the same time demonstrating its specificity 
and added-value. Most importantly, it ought to 
combine with the several EU bodies already pre-
sent in Kosovo in order to ensure the coherence 
and efficiency of EU external action. 
NATO represents an interlocutor of cardinal im-
portance as the KFOR remains the force ulti-
mately in charge of stability and security in Kos-
ovo. However, no formal cooperation agree-
ments exist between the two missions. This is 
resulting from the deadlock prevailing at the 
NAC-ESDP council (Brussels) over the Turkey-
Cyprus issue. Nonetheless, beyond institutional 
considerations, EULEX and KFOR have been 
coordinating on the field demonstrating a will to 
make use of their complementarity. For in-
stance, an informal three wave response (Kosovo 
Police – EULEX – KFOR) arrangement prevails 
in situation of violent protests. As for the other 
CSDP missions, “bureaucratic squabbling have 
been confined to the corridors of power in Brus-
sels”33 – the two actors endeavor to work prag-
matically side by side on the field. The deadlock 
at the headquarters’ level preclude deeper and 
formalized arrangements, but the cooperation in 
Kosovo has been rendered efficient by the fact 
that the EULEX/KFOR coordination mecha-
nisms have been arranged on the ground and in 
light of the context (while in Bosnia a top-down 
approach had been implemented). More gener-
ally, NATO – wishing to pull out from Kosovo – 
welcomed EULEX deployment favorably and 
demonstrated interest in its potential abilities in 
maintaining public order. In the medium term, a 
potential next step would be the deployment of a 
CSDP military mission in replacement – or 
rather continuation (i.e. following the Concordia 
mission precedent in Macedonia) – of KFOR34.  
The mandates of the OSCE Mission in Kosovo 
(OMIK) being closer to that of EULEX, some 
risks of overlapping exist in the fields of judicial 
and police training. This is especially the case as 
no coordination channels have been set up be-
tween the two missions. Serbia and Russia being 
member states of the organization, the OSCE 
appears even more paralyzed by the status ques-
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tion. In any case, OMIK specificity lies more with 
media development, minority rights and local 
governance. And OMIK is anyway progressively 
reducing its activities along the pull out of UN-
MIK (of which it was a pillar) and because of the 
non endorsement of the Athisaari plan by the 
UNSC. 
However, EULEX’s most important relational 
challenge actually pertains to its cooperation 
with the gamut of other EU bodies operating in 
Kosovo. The paroxysm of this institutional inter-
twinement materialized in Peter Feith’s position, 
being at the same time the International Civilian 
Representative (ICR) – that is the head of the 
International Civilian Office – and EU Special 
representative (EUSR). Such double-hating is 
not new in the Balkans, but it revealed problem-
atic after the declaration of independence. The 
two institutions find themselves with different 
legal basis: the ICR applies the Athisaari plan 
while the EUSR remains under 124435. Overall, 
this schizophrenic double-hating complicated 
the relationship with EULEX. While, in theory, 
EULEX should seek political guidance from the 
EUSR, it has been wary to keep its distance in an 
endeavor to cultivate its image of neutrality on 
the status question. Difficult relations between 
the EUSR and the CSDP mission seems to be a 
recurrent problem in EU’s external relations – 
similar tensions existed in Bosnia, in Georgia 
and in Afghanistan. This pattern should be ad-
dressed by the new Lisbon Treaty architecture 
however, where EUSR hats will be granted to 
heads of the Delegation of the Commission. As a 
matter of fact, Peter Feith’s mandate as EUSR 
ended on April 30th 2011.  
The Commission, through its liaison office 
(ECLO), remains the EU’s main lever towards 
Kosovo authorities. More than a critique from 
the EUSR or the EULEX Head of Mission, a 
negative assessment in the Commission’s report 
evaluating the progress towards EU membership 
remains the best incentives for reforms36. 
EULEX has been endeavoring to work closer 
with the Commission in order to capitalize on 
this ‘conditionality lever’. For instance, in an ef-
fort to be accepted by the local authorities at its 
beginnings, EULEX channeled some of its early 
critique and demands through the ECLO. Simi-
larly, the ECLO has been relying on EULEX’s 
numerous agents and experts to contribute in-
formation to the aforementioned report. How-
ever the coordination between the two bodies 
still needs improvement, notably in crucial areas 
such as counseling in legal drafting. The new in-
stitutional architecture introduced by the Lisbon 
Treaty, where the EU High Representative for 
CFSP is also vice-President of the Commission, 
could create the conditions for a better coordina-
tion between EULEX and the ECLO, and thus a 
greater coherence of EU’s external action37. 
 
Conclusion 
A closer look at the context of EULEX deploy-
ment, its activities as well as its interactions with 
other International Organizations revealed an 
important degree of adaptability and some nota-
ble assets in civilian crisis management while at 
the same time emphasizing underlying chal-
lenges confronting EU security policy. 
First, being the premier civilian mission of this 
scope in terms of mandate and size, the deploy-
ment of EULEX can be regarded as an opera-
tional success for CSDP. Second, addressing in 
particular several of the weaknesses of EUPM 
Bosnia, EULEX demonstrates an ability on the 
part of CSDP to capitalize on previous experi-
ences. Considering the time frame of the various 
police missions’ deployments, the EU can be de-
picted as a fast-learner in this regard. Third, con-
sidering the intricate political contexts – 
whether Brussels’ or Pristina’s – in which 
EULEX was set up, the EU can be said to have 
shown a great capacity of adaptation. The fact 
that the mission was launched in spite of these 
political impediments tends to confirm that the 
CSDP and its operations have a dynamic of their 
own (i.e. some degree of autonomy). Beyond cri-
sis management, CSDP missions serve the func-
tion of enhancing the international status of the 
EU on the world scene by demonstrating its 
presence on the ground. This ‘demonstrative 
function’ is particularly salient in the case of 
EULEX as the mission is deployed in a region 
where the US are progressively disengaging and 
where the EU ought to be credible if it is to be 
credible at all as a security actor. 
The EU demonstrates certain savoir faire in 
Rule of Law promotion by being able to combine 
various aspects of institution-building (police, 
justice and customs). As a matter of fact, inter-
national actors appear well-disposed to interact 
with the EU in the realm of security and some-
times actually call for its greater involvement. 
US participation in the mission as well as 
NATO’s eagerness to share the security burden 
with EULEX can be interpreted as an increasing 
recognition of the EU as a regional security actor 
and seems to mark a further step in terms of ex-
ternal legitimacy for CSDP. The deployment of a 
CSDP military mission in replacement of KFOR 
– NATO seeking to progressively withdraw from 
Kosovo – appears however for now as a step too 
far that neither the EU member states seem fully 
ready to take nor the US or the Kosovo authori-
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ties would be totally comfortable with38.  
Beyond its rather promising debut, EULEX faces 
some resilient challenges. The mission’s capacity 
to successfully deliver on its mandate and to 
make a difference in Kosovo will depend ulti-
mately on its ability to strike a balance between 
its proactive (i.e. mentoring and monitoring) 
and reactive (i.e. ‘executive functions’) preroga-
tives. Its mandate leaves open the choice be-
tween a cooperationist and an interventionist 
approach (i.e. on the way to wield its authority) 
when facing a situation of normative breach39. In 
the former, EULEX runs the risk of seeing its 
recommendation ignored while some of the Kos-
ovo media are already reproaching the mission 
for limited results in tackling corruption. In the 
latter case, EULEX intervenes at the detriment 
of Kosovo institution ownership and thus ex-
poses itself to the protectorate critic. In spite of 
these criticisms, EULEX should not relinquish 
any of these two approaches: while it ought to 
foster a self-standing democratic culture in Kos-
ovo the developing nature of Kosovo institutions 
sometimes requires going beyond mere advis-
ing40. EU Membership conditionality, compel-
ling reforms without direct intervention, stands 
out as a potential way out of this Gordian knot41. 
More generally, as emphasized by Grevi, effi-
ciently and durably tackling the three most 
prominent issues on top of EULEX agenda 
(namely improving inter-ethnic relations, fight-
ing organized crime and dealing with widespread 
corruption and clientelism) depends in great 
part on progress in the de-centralization process 
and in reinvigoration of the economy, two do-
mains where “EULEX can provide much help 
but is not the core player”42. Thus, the coopera-
tion with other EU agencies appears crucial.   
The Balkans stands out as a unique region where 
the EU has the opportunity to back its security 
policy with its normative power. In such a con-
text, the EU can bring about a considerable 
added-value in crisis management and peace-
building if it efficiently coordinates CSDP with 
other instruments of EU external action (i.e. 
enlargement policy). The case of EULEX how-
ever made salient the issue of coherence in EU 
external relations. In his seminal book, Brian 
White distinguished between three strands in 
European foreign policy: Member States na-
tional foreign policy; EU coordination of its po-
litical relations with the outside world; and long-
standing foreign economic policy aspects 
(usually conducted by the Commission)43. In 
Kosovo, the first and second aspects are some-
how divergent while the second and third are 
insufficiently coordinated. In a way, there is a 
discrepancy between the Union’s foreign policy 
and its security policy: a CSDP mission in charge 
of monitoring the independence was launched in 
spite of a lack of consensus on the status. In ad-
dition to this uncommon political issue, some 
deficiencies have been noted as regard the coop-
eration between the various EU institutions 
(EULEX, EUSR, ECLO…) present in Kosovo. 
These were stemming in large part from the dis-
persion of EU actors; the Lisbon Treaty architec-
ture will hopefully streamline EU presence by 
merging ECLO and EUSR mandates. More gen-
erally, the External Action Service – combining 
enlargement policy and CSDP instruments – has 
potentially the means to foster the much needed 
coordination identified above. It remained to be 
seen however whether this new institution will 
be backed by sufficient political will and appro-
priate resources. But overall the problems and 
challenges facing EULEX stem as much from a 
lack of coherence in the use of EU instruments 
than from a lack of cohesion among member 
states.  
EULEX stands out as the paragon of CSDP’s no-
torious ‘constructive ambiguity’44. It stands in 
the schizophrenic posture of assisting in building 
the institutions of a state it has not officially rec-
ognized – unrecognized state-building in other 
words. In spite of the status conundrum and the 
division of Member States on the question, 
EULEX operational deployment was rather suc-
cessful and the mission has assets in civilian cri-
sis management and rule of law promotion, al-
though results are unlikely to be immediately 
visible. Thus, in Kosovo the EU is constructing 
ambiguity while displaying constructive disu-
nity.◊ 
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